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B

APPELLEES5 MISSTATEMENTS OF FACTS:
Throughout their Brief, Appellees makes several material misstatements of fact,
i.e., misstatements in that they are denied by the Record. Those misstatements and
the place in the Record where said denial is found are:

APPELLEES5 STANDING1-

PEHP 's request for declaratory judgment alleges PEHP suffered a distinct
injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome.
Appellees5 Brf., @ 8 & 13

A close review of the Appellees5 Request for Declaratory Judgment makes no
mention of this statement or any similar statement.
Record, @ 1 - 6.

SUFFICIENCY OF ORDER2-

The Order contains all the items necessary to meet the requirements in the
Adjudicative Hearing Procedures under Utah law and should be affirmed.
Appellees' Brf. @ 9 [Order is Addendum "A".]

But see Appellees' Brief- Addendum "B" - Adjudicative Hearing Procedures
That is Section 7- entitled, ORDERS- states the hearing officer shall issue an order
that includes:
ii-

a statement of conclusions of law;

iii-

a statement of reasons for the decision.

In the Order there is no "statement" of the reasons for the decision.
Appellees5 Brf. Addendum "A55 - Order

The Hearing Officer made "conclusions" of law without referencing any
factual support. Additionally, in "conclusions" numbered 3 and 4, the
hearing officer provided no legal authority to support his "legal conclusions"
Record, Order @ 337 Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 345 para. 26 [Utah,
1999] commands more. It requires an ''analysis concerning the statutory
criteria... It was error to [make conclusions] ... without applying the
statutory standard for making such a determination." Without such an
analysis, the trial court's findings cannot be upheld.

Accordingly, we find the Hearing Officer's "Conclusions of LAW" that have no
mention whatsoever referencing any legal authority and consequently, with no
analysis of the supporting law as dictated under Young, said conclusions cannot be
upheld. The fatally defective Conclusion of LAW totally void any supporting legal
authority are:
2-

The contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy
is legally enforceable.

3-

Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.

And,
4-

The plain language of the PEHP Master Policy requires PEHP to be
reimbursed $30,047.45 the amount it paid in medical expenses on behalf
of Respondent Ms. Kramer for which she received a $100,000 settlement.
Record, @ 338
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But more importantly the Orders section [Section 7 a) (i) & (ii)] of the
Adjudicative Hearing Procedures [Appellees'- Addundum B] specifically
mentions the phrases a "statement of finding of fact", a "statement of conclusions
of law" and a "statement of reasons for the decision" thus, noting a difference
among the three requirements. The mandatory requirement to issue an order with a
"statement of reasons for the decision" is glaringly absent from the Order under
review. Clearly, this mandate required the Hearing Officer to explain the reasons
that supported his decision. Appellees' Brf., @ 19. The hearing officer failed to
follow this mandate despite the Kramers5 specific written request to do so:

At the hearing, there were several issues before you and Respondent's
respectfully request your findings of fact on each material issue.
my clients need to know what you decided, what your findings were
on each of the issues before you and what conclusions of law you reached
in support of same.
Letter to hearing officer - Record, @ 330-331

Continuing, under Section 7- Point (e) (iii), it says: the hearing officer shall
consider any written objections and then prepare the final order. Here the
Appellees' counsel prepared the final order.

Appellees' Brf., @ 9 & 20.

While Section 7 (e)(i) permits the hearing officer to delegate preparing the initial
order to counsel, once written objections are filed and considered, then the Hearing
Officer himself shall .... prepare a final order. See Section 7 (e) (ii) and (iii).
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Thus, the Order did not contain all the items necessary to meet the requirements of
the Adjudicative Hearing Procedures and the Hearing Officer delegated a nondelegable duty to counsel.

Problematic with the hearing officer's letter to counsel of 08/20/07 was his
directive to Appellees' counsel to amend the earlier order and now "cite the
statute relied on.55 Record, @ 334 How does Appellees' counsel know what
statute the hearing officer relied upon in making his legal conclusion? Then he
directs counsel to amend the conclusions of law to reflect he found the subrogation clause legally enforceable offering no indication upon what legal or factual
authority relied upon in arriving at this conclusion of law.

Record, @ 334

FACTUAL DISPUTES3-

Appellants: failed to actually dispute any facts before the Hearing Officer in
their Memorandum in Opposition to PEHP's Motion for Summary Judgment
and do not raise additional factual arguments here. Appellees5 Brf., @ 10

And:
the Kramers failed to allege any disputed facts. Appellees' Brf., @ 10 & 21
And,
The: Kramers failed to correctly dispute and thus agreed to the undisputed
facts in the Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Kramers failed to allege
any disputed facts.
Appellees' Brf., @ 21

And, The Kramers provided no affidavits or actual contentions disputing any of
PEHP's statement of undisputed fact.
Appellees' Brf., @ 22

The Record is replete with Appellants' dispute over: 1- PEHP's statement of facts,
2- the understanding, intentions and consequences of the facts PEHP's stated, and,
3- the Kramers' list of additional facts [that raised more disputes] that Appellees
did not set forth in their Statement of Facts. See - Appellants5 Brf., @ xvi to xix
for specific Record references to these factual disputes.
Appellees have asserted blatant misstatements of facts. The Appellants' contest
surrounding such misstatements of fact have created factual disputes. To wit,
Appellees' assertion that:

The PEHP Master Policy is the valid contract between PEHP
and the Kramers.
Brf., @ 11
And,
.. .both PEHP and the Kramers agree that the PEHP Master Policy
was the contract between them....
Brf., @ 24
The parties agree that the Kramers enrolled with PEHP and agreed
to the terms of the PEHP Master Policy by signing the PEHP
Enrollment Form.
Brf,, @ 26

These are major misstatements of fact. Appellants pointedly said:
The Public Employee Health Plan [the Master Policy]:
was not the Appellants' "insurance contract"
Appellants' Brf., @ xix - @ 8
And,
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... the Plan itself was not Appellants' tlinsurance contract. " That
is, Appellants signed the "Enrollment Form " which mentioned the
PEHP's Master Policy but in violation ofU.C.A. 31A-21-106.... "
Appellants' Brf., @ xxi @ 8
And,
If the PEHP Master Policy was not attached to the Enrollment Form,
the insurance contract, but was only incorporated by reference then it is not
enforceable against Appellants
Appellants' Brf., @ 23, @ 8

The Appellants signed the Enrollment Form. [Appellees' Brf., @ 6- @ 3] They
did not sign the Master Policy. And it was not referred to when Appellant Kelly
Kramer signed the Enrollment Form.

Kelly Kramer's Affidavit, Record, @ 106

To dispute Appellees' Statement of Facts, and to add other disputed facts not
mentioned by Appellees in its "Statement of Facts.", Appellants followed the
directives of Rule 7(c )(3)B of the U.R.C.P., to wit:

A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving's party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted the
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute
supported by citation to relevant materials such as affidavits or discovery
material. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials.
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The Appellants' Brief is replete with factual arguments why the Kramers disputed
the Appellees' Statement of Facts with their Statement of Additional Facts with
citations to the Record and legal authority.
See Appellants' Brief with said Record references @ xiv to xx and pages 2 to 5
and Record, @ 272 - 279 Respondent's Opposition to Summary Judgment

APPELLANTS5 AFFIDAVITS4-

Appellees assert that the: Kramers were required to provide affidavits.... "
and the Kramers provided no affidavits.
Appellees5 Brf.5 @ 22

The is misleading as the Record contains an affidavit from both Appellants
Kelly and Rose Kramer. Record, @ 106 & 107. Those affidavits went
uncontested and in themselves created material factual disputes, i.e., PEHP never
provided the policy, never explained the policy and PEHP offered it to the Kramers
as an adhesion contract proposition, that is: you take it or leave it. // only takes one
sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of the controversy and
create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Holbrook v. Adams, 542
P.2dl91, 194 [Utah, 1975]

Moreover, the Kramers needed to provide "affidavits" only if the moving party,
Appellees, had filed affidavits. If the movant files no affidavits, the opposing party
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can rest on his pleadings. Parrish v. Layton City, 542 P.2d 1086, 1088 [Utah,
1975]; Rule 56 (e), U.R.C.P.

UNENFORCABLE SUBROGATION RIGHTS5-

The Kramers failed to point to any way in which the language could be
reasonably understood in two different ways.
Appellees5 Brf., @ 12

This is misleading because Appellants never proffered that argument. They have
always asserted that the language of subrogation provision of the Master Policy is
unenforceable because the policy:

a-

is ambiguous in failing to define several material, technical terms.
Appellants9 Brf., @ vi, xvii, xviii, 2, 18, 20-21, with Record cites.

b-

used terms that were not set forth in clear language readily
understandable by the average purchaser of insurance.
Appellants5 Brf., @ vii, xvii, 3, 21, with Record references.

And,
c-

has operative terms that are hidden deeply in the policy.
Appellants' Brf., @ vii, xviii, 4, 18, 25 with Record references.

Next Appellees state: The Kramers ...merely lob allegations without support in
making their claim without any explanation as to why the Master Policy provision
is ambiguous , what terms are undefined would not be understood by the
reasonable purchaser if insurance.

Appellees5 Brf., @ 33
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This is another blatant misrepresentation. The Record at 280 -282 identifies six
operative, technical terms in the subrogation provision that are not defined. That
Record offers arguments and legal authorities supporting Appellants5 positions.

SANDBERG FACTUAL DISPUTES6-

Appellees again mislead the court in stating:
Nowhere does the Sandberg Court state or even imply that if the
consequences of facts result in a dispute of law that it would preclude
summary judgment.
Apppellees' Brf., @ 24

Appellants never offered the Sandberg holding as authority addressed to any
"dispute of law.55 They offered Sandberg as authority for a way to find factual
disputes that can preclude summary judgment, i.e., factual disputes can arise from
the differences in the parties5 understanding, intentions and consequences of
otherwise "undisputed55 facts. Appellants' Brf., @ 19 & 26

INVALID INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE7-

Continuing, Appellees state: ...the Master Policy does not incorporate the
subro-gation provision, or any other provision, by reference.
Appellees' Brf., @ 27

Again, Appellants never made such an argument. Appellants have argued that the
contract, the Enrollment Form incorporated by reference the Master Policy. They
argued that the Master Policy was unenforceable for, to incorporate by reference a
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document not attached to, nor set forth at length in, the contract violates Utah law.
Appellants' Brf., @ vii - point E, xix, xxi - point 8, xxix - point D, 3-D, 17-B,
23-24 point 8,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ERRORS8-

In footnote 5 to its Brief, Appellees state that: The Kramers restate their
argument made before the Hearing Officer in their Appellants' Opening
Brief @ 20-26, but do not claim the Hearing Officer erred in making his
conclusions of law.

This clearly misstates the facts. Appellants5 Brief has several arguments supporting
their claims that the hearing officer's "Conclusions of Law" were in error.
Specifically, Appellants asserted that the hearing officer:

1-

referenced no legal authority on points 2 or 3 in his Conclusions
of Law.
Record - Order, @ 338

And,
2-

adopted and rely upon an single authority in his first Conclusion
of Law but that authority did not support the conclusion he made based
upon it.
Order, Record, @ 338

Appellants' Brf., @ xx, xxii, 5, 6-7, 13, & 28-31, with Record references.

In the context of this misrepresentation of fact, it is significant that in their Brief,
Appellants devoted a three page argument addressed to the errors in the Hearing
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Officer's reliance on U.C.A, 49-11-613 in finding that Appellees had standing to
bring the underlying Request for Declaratory Judgment.

Brief, @ 28-31

E N R O L L M E N T FORMAppellees allege that: the enrollment form contains no material terms between the
parties, the PEHP enrollment form was not the contract between the Kramers and
PEHP. Brf, @ 27. The Enrollment Form is page .... of the Record. Even a
cursory reviewing the Enrollment Form shows it does have material terms wherein
the insured:
a-

authorizes deductions for premiums and the release of information to
health providers;

b-

certifies the his/her dependants as listed;

and,
c-

agrees to use a preferred panel physicians and facilities.
Record, @ 86- Section C

CONTRACT L A W AUTHORITIESAppellees argue that since PEHP is "self-insured" it is not subject to the Insurance
Code. Appellant has argued that it is subject to appellate holdings in contract law
and if a holding involves the principles of contract law construction then that
holding is applicable even if the opinion involved a dispute under an insurance
contract. That is, if the holding involves contract law it applies to all contracts
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whether the particular contract involves real estate, employment or insurance or
other contracts. In Appellees' Brief they have agreed to this argument in citing the
Gunn case: the subrogation provision in the Master Policy would be a ''matter of
contract law interpretation."

Appellees' Brief @ 12, 33 & 35

MADE WHOLE ARGUMENTNext Appellees argue that the Kramers got a "large settlement" quietly suggesting
Mrs. Kramer has been made whole. Brfv @ 25 This is not so and the Record
refutes this argument. In her Affidavit, Mrs. Kramer attests that she suffered:
ab-

a significant, 25% - 27% permanent injury;
a significant loss in future earnings due to her permanent injury;

cd-

some $50,000 in past medical bills;
$10,000 in legal costs in securing her settlement; and,

e-

in excess of $500,000 in past and future special damages,
Kramer Affidavit, Record, @ 106 & Appellees' Brf., @ xv

Appellees never contested this testimony. It remained before the hearing officer
unimpeached. A $110,000 settlement is not a large settlement when contrasted
against over $510,000 in damages. Taking the 25% whole person impairment
together with net recovery of far less than $50,000 and referencing it against some
$450,000 in future special damages proves Mrs. Kramer was not "made whole."
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APPELLEES HAVE NO STANDINGStanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied
before a district court may even entertain a question
Washington County Water v. Morgan, 82 P.3d 1125,1129 [UT. 03]
Appellants have vigorously contested the Petitioner's/Appellees' standing to bring
the underlying Request for Declaratory Judgment. The Appellees' Brief further
supports this position. To wit:
Appellees profer U.C.A., 63-46b-16(4) as the standard for review of this appeal. It
says this Court can grant relief if:

b)

the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;

e)

the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;

f)

the person taking the agency action .... were subject to disqualification,

h)

the agency action is:
i)

an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute;

Hi)

otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Appellees' Brf., @ 2

Appellees then cite "Statutory Provisions." One such provision being U.C.A. 4911-613, entitled, Appeals procedure - Right of appeal to hearing officer Board Reconsideration - Judicial Review. Appellees set forth this statute at
length. Brf., @ 3-4 In pertinent part it says:
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I)(a) All members, retires, participants, alternative payees, or covered individuals
of a system, plan or program under this title shall acquaint themselves
b)

Any dispute regarding a benefit, right, obligation .... under this title is
subject to the procedures provided for under this section.

c)

A person who disputes a benefit, right, obligation,
request a ruling by the executive director

d)

A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director ... with
respect to any benefit, right or obligation .... under this title, shall request a
review of that claim by a hearing officer.

2-

The hearing officer shall:

b)

follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified under this title.

c)

hear and determine all facts

3-'

The board shall review and approve and deny all decision of the hearing
officer.

7-

A party aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain judicial review..

8-

The board may make rules to implement this section.
Appellees' Brf., @ 2-3 & 15

under this title shall

By specific statutory definition PEHP is "program." See U.C.A. 49-11-102 (32),
entitled, Definitions and U.C.A. 49-20-102 also entitled, Definitions. Instantly, in
the context of U.C.A. 49-11-613 (l)(a) members, participants .... of a program
shall acquaint themselves with their rights. The members or participants are
"people" under a plan or program. Then U.C.A., 49-20-401 addresses exactly

14

what programs can do. While it is an extensive listing it makes no mention
whatsoever of a program having any authority to bring an action before the Board.
It says programs can "process claims.55 Enforcing subrogation rights is not
"processing a claim.55

Additionally, under U.C.A., 49-11-613 (c )(d) only "persons" can bring disputes
to the Board, request reconsideration of a Board decision and subsequently bring
their dispute to a hearing officer. Appellees have argued that under U.C.A. 63,
46b-2(l)(g) a person who can initiate administrative action includes "programs"
like PEHP Appellees' Brf., @ 16 But that statute makes no mention of a
"program.55 Moreover, the specific statutes under which the Board's programs
were created and continue to operate under, did not grant such authority to either
the Board [the executive director] or the "program.55 Nor, is there any reference
that the "program55 is an agency or a governmental subdivision. A universal tenant
of statutory law is when there are two statutes but one is specific while the other is
general, then the specific statute controls over the general statute.

Particular expressions qualify those which are general.
CA Civil Code - 3534

Here Appellees want to use a general statute [U.C.A. 63-46b-2(l)(g) - The
Administrative Procedures Act] to support their position but the direct statute that
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governs the exact questions in contest and the exact parties in this appeal [U.C.A.
49-11-613 (c )(d) - The Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act]
contradicts Appellees5 citation. Equally important, under U.C.A. 49-11-613 (b) it
directly states that it is operative when its provisions differs from U.C.A. 63-46b.
To wit: The hearing officer shall:

b)

follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified under this title.

Under this title, the Board [executive director] has no standing to bring the initial
Request for Declaratory Judgment for "only persons can." And when the term
"person" is used in a statute where in the same statute the terms "executive
director", "the Board" and "a party" are also used, it is clear the legislature was
assigning distinct and different meaning to each term. Each term in a statute is
used advisedly. Harmon City v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1168 [Utah,
1995]; Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 [UT, 1995]

Clearly, only a "person" can bring a dispute to the executive director and later to a
hearing officer. Just as clearly, the "executive director" can only make an initial
determination of the dispute. "The Board" can consider applications for reconsideration and has only review powers over the hearing officer's decision. It can
implement this section. Then ''aparty aggrieved" with the hearing officer's

16

decision can seek the Board's reconsideration or move for appellate review. See
U.C.A., 49-11-613, Subsections (c), (d), 3, 5, 6, 7, & 8.

Subsection 8 states:

The Board may makes rules to implement this section.

Appellees now argue that the Board conferred authority upon itself to bring a
dispute before the Board. And then it further delegated this authority to PEHP.
Appellees say this action "explains the administrative hearing procedures."
Appellees' Brf., @ 15. But to self-servingly grant such authority is well beyond
"implementing" this section and it does nothing to "explain the administrative
hearing procedures." For in their Brief @ 5, Appellees also cite the purpose of The
Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act at U.C-A., 49-20-105 - Purpose:

The purpose of this chapter is too provide a mechanism for covered
employers to provide covered individuals with group health, dental
medical
insurance
and other programs requested by the state
in the most efficient and economical manner.

For the board to confer upon itself the authority to bring disputes before itself'is
clearly not implementing "the purpose to provide insurance." This is especially
true when the legislature did not grant it such authority when the legislature created
it. This denial of authority is clear. In examining the wording of the statute it is
evident that the legislature was aware of the differences among the members, the
persons, the board, the executive director and insurance programs.
17

Furthermore, in elementary common sense it is likewise obvious under the statute
[U.C.A., 49-11-613] and the purpose behind the Act, that the executive director
and the board cannot put "self-interested" disputes before itself for a ruling. To do
so is to abuse the authority to "implement" the statute as it would invite a conflict
in the board [executive director] in having a self-interest in its rulings. This
argument is further supported by the board's [executive director's] action in going
straight to the hearing officer while bypassing the initial executive director ruling.
To "implement" means "to execute", "to carry into effect" whatever it is you are
charged with implementing. Instantly, under the purpose of the Act [U.C.A. 4920-105], to implement means the board can use its given powers "to provide a
mechanism .... to provide covered individuals with group health, dental, medical,
.. ..and other programs..."

It does not mean the board can create new, distinct

powers. It does not mean to engage in practices beyond the purposes of the Act.

Again, we find the purpose statute making a clear distinction between "people",
i.e., "covered individuals" in difference to "programs". Programs are insurancelike plans providing medical, health and other benefits to covered individuals. For
the board to confer upon itself authority to bring a dispute before the hearing
officer is not "explaining the hearing procedures" as it has argued.
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Another reason invaliding the board or executive director's action in appointing
itself with such authority is that it directly interferes with the procedures set forth
under the statute. U.C.A., 49-11-613 (b) says: any dispute regarding a right,
benefit, obligation ...is subject to the procedures provided under this section. In
granting itself the powers to bring its own declaratory action directly to the hearing
officer, the board dispenses with the statute's pre-requisite of securing a executive
director's ruling on the dispute before going to the hearing officer. Clearly, to
abrogate the statutory procedures is to violate the plain mandates of the law.
Appellees cite Gunn v. USRB, 2007 UT App. 4, for the holding that the Board has
1- subject matter jurisdiction over all Title 49 disputes and, 2- a plaintiff must
exhaust all administrative remedies before "appealing" a decision. Appellees cited
Gunn: ... any right asserted against PEHP must be first submitted to the agency's
review process. Brf., @17 Appellants agree.

The Gunn Court required Mr. Gunn to follow the specific, procedural rules of the
Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act. The Board and the executive
director are not above the same directive. They also must follow the specifics of
the law. In this instance it did not. Actually, in bringing the underlying Request
for Declaratory Action the board violated the operative statute. There were two
"administrative remedies" Mr. Gunn needed to exhaust before seeking relief in the
court system, an executive director's ruling and then a hearing officer's ruling.
19

Here the Board amputated the first remedy of securing an executive director's
ruling. That is, notwithstanding the clear mandated procedures charged to
Mr. Gunn, the board just conveniently side-stepped this remedy, no doubt, due to
its inherent conflict of interests.

Appellees argue that the "new" Rules say the executive director:

may file a petition for a declaratory order determining the applicability
of a statute, rule or order of the Board...
Brf. @ 15

The issue in contest is the question of the validity of PEHP's subrogation rights
against the Kramers' "made whole" rights. The subrogation rights are a provision
of the PEHP's Master Policy. Under the Board's Administrative Hearing
Procedure, as cited, these "rights" do not involve determining the applicability of:
a-

a statute,
b-

a rule,

or,
c-

an order.

The board's newly adopted administrative procedures are a verbatim track of
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act [U.CA., 63-46b-21(l)]. This
statute has the very same limitations, i.e., all requests for action are limited
to determining the applicability of a statute, a rule or an order.
Appellees' Brf., @ 16
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Accordingly, in this instance, the executive director has filed a Request for a
Declaratory Judgment for a determination on an issue completely outside of any of
the three reasons where under he supposedly has authority to file a petition. It is
unmistakable that the executive director has clearly exceeded the parameters of his
authority as he, himself, has memorialized in writing.

Another argument is that U.C.A., §49-11-301(3) says the assets of the fund are for
the exclusive benefit of the members and "may not be diverted or appropriated for
any purpose other than that permitted under this title." Title 49 is silent on
subrogation rights, save that a monthly disability payment "shall be reduced" for
monies received by way of judgment or settlement from a third party liable for the
disability. U.C.A., §49-21-402. The powerful argument is that if the Legislature
saw fit to incorporate subrogation reimbursement provisions under a disability
payment from the monies recovered from a liable third party, it could have inserted
a like provision under the member claim's payment procedures but did not do so.
Thus, you argue the Legislature's failure to incorporate such a provision was
intentional, i.e., that each term used in a statute is used "advisedly" and since the
Legislature "could have added" language but did not, it was intentional. Harmon
City v. Neilsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995); Neel v. State, 889
P.2d 922, 926, (Utah 1995).
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Under the criteria of authority given this appellate court as set forth in U.C.A.,
63-46b-16(4), Appellants deserve relief for they have been substantially prejudiced
by the facts that:

b)

the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;

Clearly, the board [executive director] acted beyond the jurisdiction of
U.C.A., 49-11-613. It went beyond "implementing" in taking actions far in
excess of the purpose of the Act "to provide insurance like benefits " to
"covered individuals."

e)

the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
Here the board [executive director] engaged in unlawful procedures and
failed to follow prescribed procedures when it circumvented the specific
procedures of the governing statute. It engaged in unlawful decision-making
when it granted itself authority well beyond the purposes of the act, well
beyond "implementing" the statute and in direct contradiction to both the
terms and purpose of the statute.

f)

the person taking the agency action .... were subject to disqualification.
The board, [the executive director] is subject to disqualification for
circumventing the mandatory procedures of the statute and in conferring
22

upon itself authority that abrogated mandatory procedures and the purposes
under the statute.

h)

the agency action is:
i)

an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute;

iii)

otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Conferring upon itself authority that circumvented the statute's purpose and
which authority contravened the statute itself is far more than an "abuse of
discretion5' and far exceeds the boundaries of "arbitrary and capricious."

Because of the inherent conflict between the board bringing its own petitions and
the need to dispense with the statute's mandatory procedure to permit this, and
because of the inherent conflict between the board bringing its own actions and the
fundamental purpose of the Act, our legislature did not confer any "petitioning"
authority on the board.

CONCLUSIONIn contested cases, it is the duty of the trial court to finds facts upon all material
issues submittedfor decision unless the findings are waived. Boyer v. Lingell, 567
P.2d 1112, 1114 [Utah, 1997] The hearing officer summarily found no issues in
contest and he did this despite many contested factual issues and despite a specific

23

request directly from Appellants asking him to make factual findings on all the
factual issues before him.

So Appellants are battling a summary judgment based on a "summary" discharge
of the hearing officer's mandated duties that made factual conclusions without
actually addressing the facts. Additionally, he failed to perform his mandated
duties by making his "conclusions of law" without citing his legal reasoning. And
for the one legal conclusion he made wherein he did cite a legal authority, the
authority does not support his conclusion.

In granting summary judgment, the hearing officer found, that despite the
Appellants' factual disputes, there were no factual disputes and thus, the
Appellees' showing:

precluded all reasonable possibilities that, if given a trial, Appellants
could produce evidence which reasonably sustain a judgment in their favor.
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge, 354 P.2d 559, 562 [Utah, 1960]

The hearing officer failed to give Appellants a "fair hearing." His errors are
multiple, grave and manifestly and legally invalid. They denied Appellants "due
process."
... every person who brings a claim in court or at a hearing held before an
administrative agency has a right ....to receive a fair trial in front of a fair
tribunal.
Burnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333[UT, 1987]
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And,
Despite the flexibility of administrative hearings, there remains the
"necessity of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural
fairness in administrative hearings ".
Tolman v. S. L. County Atty., 818 P.2d 23, 28 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]

The Statutes under the Utah State Retirement Act and specifically the Public
Employees Benefit and Insurance Act which created Appellees' authority did not
authorize the Board or the PEHP, to initiate action. If the legislature did not grant
them authority to prosecute the underlying Petition, then that lack of authority was
intentional. Harmon City v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1168 [Utah,
1995]; Neel y. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 [UT, 1995]

For the reasons stated herein together with the reasons set forth in the Opening
Brief and as supplemented by the Record, Appellants respectfully request this
court reverse the hearing officer's grant of summary judgment.

•k-k it-k Jc *-& * ±

Date 28, May 2008

Remectfully submitted;
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ADDENDUM A
APPELLANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKECOMES Now Appellants and move this Court to strike from the record on appeal
and from any consideration all references in Appellees' Brief to:

A-

Addendum "C"; and,

B-

the citation of UCA 49-ll-613(l)(e) 2008 - Brf. @ 15

Re:

NEWMAN AFFIDAVIT-

Addendum "C" is a 03/28/08, affidavit by a Robert Newman, relating that as
Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement Board that on 03/31/06, he
authorized PEHP to file a Request for Declaratory Judgment.

The Affidavit was never presented to the Hearing Officer. It was first presented in
the Appellees5 Brief. It is a record created after the facts in dispute. In not being a
record in the proceedings under review by this Court, and in being a document
disputing the Appellants5 arguments contesting the Appellees' standing in bringing
the original Petition, it is unduly prejudicial.
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As offered, the Affidavit denies Appellants the opportunity to contest or crossexamines the Affiant. Such an opportunity is an historical and fundamental
foundational right underpinning our system of jurisprudence.

For each of these reasons, Appellants respectfully requests this Court strike the
Affidavit from the Record on appeal and give it no consideration by this reviewing
Court.

Re:

U.C.A. 49-11-613 - [2008 law]-

The citation to the new version of U.C.A., 49-11-613 is an amendment to a law
that became effective in May, 2008. Accordingly, it was not a record before the
hearing officer. Likewise, it is not a record in the proceedings here under review.
It is unduly prejudicial to Appellants in that it purports to defeat one of Appellants'
arguments here under appeal that Appellees had no standing to bring the original
Petition. This new subsection (e) permits the executive director to request a
hearing officer "review a dispute regarding any benefit, right, or obligation...."
Obviously, the director did not have such authority prior to 2008. Thus, it has no
probative value in a 2007, dispute contesting the extent of the board's [executive
director's] authority.
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It is a new law, a law not in effect at the time the Order under appeal was
generated. Accordingly, Appellants respectfully requests it be stricken from the
Record on appeal and given no consideration by this reviewing court.

Date: 28, May 2008

submitted;

NOTE:
[If the Court denies the request to strike the 2008 version of the law, Appellants
would point out that clearly before May, 2008, our legislature had never given the
executive director/board any authority to request a review of a dispute. Since the
board's [executive director's] underlying Request for Declaratory Relief was made
before the enactment of the new law, it violated such law when filed and
accordingly, the board lacked standing to being the Request.]

^RplyBrf-5-28-8
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